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As the Enron scandal unfolded, government and industry officials,
editorial writers, Enron employees and retirees, and the general public
spoke with one voice: those responsible should be punished. In the months
that followed Enron's disclosures, a flood of reports about executive
malfeasance at other corporations-WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, and
others-increased the demand for criminal sanctions.'
After some initial hesitation, the Bush administration wholeheartedly
embraced a criminal response to the crisis.' Early in 2002, the Department
of Justice charged David Duncan, the chief auditor at Arthur Andersen on
the Enron account, with obstruction ofjustice for directing subordinates to
destroy accounting documents.' Prosecutors secured his plea agreement
and promise to testify,4 and only months later won conviction of Enron's
auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, for obstruction of justice.5
In mid-July, the Bush administration created a "corporate crime task
force" to coordinate the growing number of criminal investigations,6 and
newspapers began to headline arrests with photographs of suited
1. By one count, fifty-four firms were being investigated by prosecutors and regulatory
agencies for accounting frauds and other financial misdeeds as of October 2002. See Gary Stoller,
Funny Numbers, USATODAY, Oct. 21,2002, at 3B (listing other firms such as ImClone, Sunbeam,
Waste Management, Xerox, Global Crossing, Qwest Communications, and RiteAid).
2. See Robert H. Frank, The Case for Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2002, at A 13 (noting
that the Bush administration at first resisted criminal initiatives); Stephen Labaton, Seemingly Close
to Nominee, S.E.C. Search is Back to Start, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at Al (stating that the
administration's use of vigorous prosecution was a tool to blunt calls for tougher regulations).
3. United States v. Duncan, No. H-02-209 (D. Tex. filed Apr. 9, 2002) (Information).
4. See id. (Cooperation Agreement).
5. Andersen, which would not survive the investigation, trial, and verdict, was ultimately
fined $500,000. See Mary Flood & Tom Fowler, Enron's Auditor Is Given the Max, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 17, 2002, at Al. At the time of this writing, Duncan has not been sentenced.
6. See John R. Wilke, President Praises Work of Task Force on Business Crime, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 27, 2002, at A4 (reporting that the task force includes law enforcement personnel from the
FBI, Treasury, and the SEC).
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executives in handcuffs doing the "perp walk."7 Congress moved in
tandem, holding various congressional hearings at which executives
asserted their Fifth Amendment rights.8 In July 2002, Congress enacted the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which, among other initiatives, created new offenses
and mandated severe penalties for violating criminal laws.9 In October
2002, prosecutors charged Enron executives Michael Kopper and Andrew
Fastow with multiple offenses.'" As this Article is being written, there are
almost daily reports of investigations and arrests."
Empathy with employees, investors, and creditors readily explains the
public's demand for punishment. One can also understand the political
expediency of a tough-on-crime response. 2 Yet this rather reflexive turn
to criminal law may be premature and is almost certainly incomplete. The
catastrophic events at Enron and other companies point to the need for a
careful analysis to determine how criminal law can contribute most
effectively to the prevention of future Enrons.
With this goal in mind, the first part of this Article reviews the chief
criminal laws implicated by conduct at Enron and notes changes wrought
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The review indicates that, despite the failure
of criminal law to deter corporate misconduct, there was no shortage of

7. David Duncan of Arthur Andersen, Andrew Fastow of Enron, Samuel Waksal of
ImClone, Scott Sullivan of WorldCom, Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco International, and John Rigas
of Adelphia Communications were among those photographed doing the "perp walk." See, e.g.,
Kurt Eichenwald, After a Boom, There Will be a Scandal.Count on It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002,
at C3. See also John C. Danforth, When Enforcement Becomes Harassment,N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2003, at A31 (critiquing the use of perp walks on the ground that they have no law enforcement
purpose and are a humiliating punishment before conviction).
8. Floyd Norris, Capital Scorn: Communists to Accountants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at
Cl.
9. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
10. See David Barboza, Enron'sMany Strands:FallenStar;From Enron FastTrackto Total
Derailment,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2002, at C I; Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Prosecutors
Probe Skilling's Role in Enron's FailedTelecom Venture, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2002, at Al. In
March 2003, federal prosecutors charged Kevin Howard and Michael Krautz with securities fraud,
wire fraud, and lying to investigators. See Kurt Eichenwald, Fraud Charges Filed Against 2
Employees of Enron Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2003, at C I(reporting indictment of two midlevel
Enron employees).
1i. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Second EnronEnergy TraderPleads Guilty,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2003, at C2; Smith & Emshwiller, supra note 10 (reporting that federal prosecutors are
investigating fraud in connection with Enron's high-speed communications business); Rebecca
Smith & John Wilke, Top Enron Trader Admits to Fraud in CaliforniaCrisis, WALL ST. J., Oct.
18, 2002, at A3 (reporting that prosecutors had reached Enron's electricity dealings and that
Timothy Belden, former head of Enron's energy-trading desk, had pleaded guilty to wire fraud for
submitting false data to California's grid operator).
12. See David Stout, Washington Talk; For Candidates, Crimes Are Now Wearing White,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at A19 (noting that politicians of both parties agreed on what to do:
punish the wrongdoers).
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criminal laws and substantial sanctions already "on the books." Part II
reveals that the most significant feature of the criminal provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is severe prison terms. Will enhanced criminal
penalties be any more effective in preventing corporate crime than were the
previous sanctions?
In an effort to answer that question, Part III presents the two primary
theories of law-abiding behavior, the rational choice and the unconscious
instinct models, and discusses their inherent limitations. The rational
choice model is limited because biased judgment can impair the
calculation that measures risk of punishment. The unconscious instinct
model is limited because competing social values of subgroups, such as a
corporate culture, can subvert an instinct to obey the law. The Enron
experience illustrates the limitations of each model. The experience
demonstrates that, standing alone, criminal law is not a particularly
effective means of creating a law-abiding business community.
But the criminal law does not stand alone. Part IV suggests that
criminal laws are only one method of monitoring business conduct; private
civil suits and government regulatory enforcement actions also are
important deterrent mechanisms. Although the criminal law can and should
be part of the effort to prevent future Enrons, it is no panacea. For
maximum effectiveness, the criminal law is better viewed as one part of a
comprehensive scheme that includes private enforcement and government
regulation. Each ofthese enforcement mechanisms should deliver a single,
consistent message to the corporate sector that expresses the community's
conception of law-abiding behavior in the corporate world.
I. THE CRIMINAL LAW LANDSCAPE BEFORE AND AFTER
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

Published reports and criminal indictments indicate that at least some
of the misconduct at Enron and other firms violated existing federal
criminal laws. 3 These laws carried substantial prison terms and fines.' 4
Thus far, the indictments indicate that prosecutors are relying on familiar
criminal laws that are often applied to white collar crimes. For instance,
Andrew Fastow, the former Chief Financial Officer of Enron, is charged
with committing wire fraud, money laundering, obstruction ofjustice, and
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering. 5

13. See, e.g., supra note 3 and infra note 15.
14. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
15. See United States v. Fastow, No. H-02-0665 (D. Tex. filed Oct. 31,2002) (listing charges
of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2003) (conspiracy); id. § 1343 (wire fraud); id. §§ 1956, 1957 (money
laundering); id. § 1512(b) (obstruction ofjustice); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting)).
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These offenses trace a typical trajectory that centers on providing
misleading and material information to others with intent to defraud them.
This conduct motivates a course of other criminal violations. For instance,
when a fraudulent scheme is undertaken by more than one person, it is
often preceded by an agreement to defraud, implicating the conspiracy
statute. 6 The fraud may be followed by attempts to conceal evidence from
investigators, triggering violations of obstruction of justice statutes.' 7
Finally, the offense of money laundering follows completion of the fraud,
when actors conceal their proceeds by using or transferring profits gained
from the fraud.' 8
Each of the criminal laws just mentioned specifies a maximum term of
imprisonment. 9 In addition, convicted felons who obtained pecuniary gain
or caused pecuniary loss are subject to criminal fines that are authorized
by a separate provision.2" The amount of the criminal fine depends upon
the defendant's gain or the victim's loss; the fine is twice the gain or loss,
whichever is greater.2
It is commonly assumed that white collar offenders are not subject to
significant penalties.22 Troubling disparities in sentences between "crime
in the suites" and "crime in the streets" undoubtedly exist.23 Nevertheless,
punishment of white collar offenders is significantly harsher than the
prison terms that were the focus of Edwin Sutherland's critique.24
Accordingly, a few comments about the federal sentencing scheme for

16. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2003).
17. Id.§§ 1503, 1505, 1512.
18. Id. §§ 1956, 1957. Mail and wire fraud, obstruction, and money laundering are predicate
acts for RICO charges. See id. § 1961 etseq. Under RICO, forfeiture of real property and financial
accounts follow conviction, and in the meantime defendants' assets are placed in escrow. Id. §
1963(a).
19. See supra notes 15-18.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 357 1(d) (2003). In nonpecuniary crimes, the maximum fine is $250,000 for
individuals and $500,000 for corporations. Id. § 3571(b)-(c). Unless a specific provision indicates
otherwise, all Title 18 felonies are subject to this fine provision. Id. § 3571.
21. Id. § 3571(d).
22. See Clifton Leaf, Enough Is Enough; White Collar Criminals: They Lie They Cheat They
Steal and They've Been Getting Away with It for Too Long, FORTUNE, Mar. 18, 2002, at 60. But
see Russ Mitchell, White-Collar Criminal? Pack Lightly for Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I1, 2002,
at BU4 (disputing the notion that major-league white collar offenders do not face heavy prison
time).
23. For analyses of this discrepancy, see Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, CorporateCrime,
and the Contingency of CriminalLiability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1311-60 (2001); Joseph E.
Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753, 756-59 (2002).
24. Sutherland is credited with identifying white collar crime in 1939. See Gilbert Geis &
Colin Goff, Introduction to EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION

xii-xiii (1983).
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white collar crimes are instructive before turning to a more detailed
discussion of the existing fraud and obstruction statutes.
Penalties for federal crimes are a function of both the particular
criminal offense and the Sentencing Guidelines. 25 Although criminal laws
specify a maximum punishment, in most cases the Guidelines largely
determine the actual sentence. 6 Since the advent of the Guidelines,
punishment of federal white collar offenses has become more serious and
more certain.27 For example, the Guidelines immediately reduced the
possibility of probationary sentences for white collar offenders.28 They also
increased prison time served by white collar offenders by ensuring that
Guideline sentences exceeded the average prison time imposed in the preGuideline era."
Moreover, under the Guidelines, judges have far less sentencing
discretion,3 ° which, in the past, may have led to lighter sentences for
middle-class offenders. Certain factors that would normally operate to
reduce the prison terms of white collar offenders, such as community
service and family responsibilities, are considered irrelevant in determining

25. See generally Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 § 211, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 and 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2003). UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL [hereinafter USSG],
ch. 1, pt. A(3) (2002) (explaining that the Guidelines were formulated to provide greater honesty,
uniformity, and proportionality in federal sentencing).
26. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-412 (1989) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Guidelines).
27. See generally Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and
Other Lessuns in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 679
(tracing the development of the Guidelines and noting their radical departure from previous federal
practice); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. I (1998) (recounting policy considerations that influenced
the formulation of the Guidelines); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics ofSentencing Reform:
The Legislative History ofthe Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKEFORESTL. REV. 223 (1993)
(examining the legislative history of the Guidelines).
28. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(4)(d) (2002) (noting that the Commission purposely wrote
Guidelines that treat white collar offenses, such as tax evasion, antitrust violations, insider trading,
and fraud as serious offenses that justify prison terms rather than probation).
29. To arrive at its initial sentencing scheme, the Commission surveyed existing sentencing
practices and used average sentences to compile new Guideline sentences. See Bowman, supra note
27, at 733-34 (noting that the Commission attempted to discover the federal common law of
sentencing and to codify it rather than determine what the penalty for an offense should be). White
collar crimes were treated differently. Instead of basing sentences on past practices, for white collar
crimes the Commission prescribed substantial increases over average prior sentences. See Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-15 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing examples of public
corruption, antitrust violations, and tax evasion).
30. The discretion of prosecutors, however, is enhanced by the Sentencing Guidelines.
Prosecutors decide what charges will be brought and also play a role in recommending a prison
sentence. See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 56 (1997) (discussing current role of prosecutors).
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the Guideline sentence. 3' Although judges may depart from that sentence,32
they may not use an offender characteristic, such as age or family
responsibility, unless it "is present to an unusual degree., 33 In 2001, the
sentencing scheme was modified to increase sentences of white collar
offenders who cause great pecuniary harm. 34 Thus, even before passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, those who committed federal white collar crimes
faced significant prison sentences and criminal fines. The failure of these
penalties to deter business misconduct raises the issue of whether
increasing criminal penalties is an effective mechanism for preventing
corporate crimes.
To begin the analysis of that issue, the following discussion reviews
three of the crimes implicated in recent scandals: mail fraud, securities
fraud, and obstruction ofjustice. It also notes how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
changes the white collar crime landscape. The discussion ends with an
evaluation of the criminal provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley.
A. Mail and Wire Fraud
Fraud, which courts have historically regarded as particularly
iniquitous,35 is at the heart of most white collar offenses. Fraud is
synonymous with dishonesty, disloyalty, and a disregard for ethical
standards of conduct; it is inherently dishonorable, marked by secrecy, lies,
and betrayal.36 In both the civil and criminal context, the main component
of fraud is deceit.37 Two federal criminal laws generally prohibit fraud in
the private sector.

31. See USSG § 5H1.1 (2002) (stating that age is not ordinarily relevant); id. § 5H2.1
(educational skills); id. § 5H1.5 (employment record); id. § 5HI.6 (family ties and responsibilities
and community ties); id. § 5H. 10 (socio-economic status); id. § 5H1. 11 (military, civic, charitable
or public service; employment-related contributions; record of prior good works).
32. See, e.g., id. § 5K2.0 (Grounds for Departure); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
81, 110-11 (1996) (providing guidance on when departure from the Guideline range of punishment
is appropriate).
33. See USSG § 5K2.0 (2002) (policy statement); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 98.
34. Among other changes, the Commission modified the loss table, which is the major
determinant of the offense level and thus the ultimate prison term. See USSG, § 2B 1.1 (2002). The
new Guidelines provide a more comprehensive definition of monetary loss: all losses that the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known were a potential result of the offense in the loss
calculation. See id § 2B1.I, cmt. n.2.
35. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, FederalCriminalFraudandthe Development ofIntangible
Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 689 n.31 (presenting judicial
characterizations of fraud).
36. See id. at 689 (noting that fraud often requires the victim's participation).
37. See MELVILLEM. BIGELOW, THE LAWOF FRAUDANDTHEPROCEDUREPERTAININGTOTHE
REDRESS THEREOF 92 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981) (1877) ("All fraud, properly speaking,
involves something of deceit. A truly fraudulent act cannot be committed without the practice of
deception.").
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1. Mail Fraud Before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The mail and wire fraud statutes apply to fraudulent schemes that
involve a mailing or an electronic transmission and that are intended to
harm another person or entity.3" Victims may sustain a loss of money,
property, or honest services that are owed by the offending actor.39 Mail
fraud is written broadly, and has been expansively interpreted, so that the
offense now encompasses an extraordinarily wide range of deceptive
conduct.40 As one would expect, the statute is a favorite and much-used
tool of federal prosecutors.4 '
The elements of the federal fraud offense are (1) devising or
participating in a scheme to defraud, (2) commission of the act with intent
to defraud, and (3) use of the mails or wires in furtherance of the
fraudulent scheme. 42 Although use of the mails or wires would seem to
limit applicability of the offense, that is not the case. It is not difficult to
establish that the defendant mailed or caused a mailing, wire, or electronic
transmission for the purposes of executing the fraud.43

38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2001). The mail and wire fraud statutes are interpreted
jointly, so decisions under one statute apply to the other. See United States v. Fermin Castillo, 829
F.2d 1194, 1198 (1st Cir. 1987). If a fraud involves mailing by the post office or through an
interstate private carrier, mail fraud is charged; if it involves the use of wire or electronic
transmission, wire fraud is charged. Id. For convenience, the term mail fraud as used herein includes
both offenses.
Reflecting its breadth and power, mail fraud has attracted a significant body of commentary.
For a useful bibliography, see Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Redefining the Boundaries, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 557, 573-77 (1998).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
40. See United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 101-03 (2d Cir. 2002) (tracing development
of the mail fraud statute); Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117, 121 (1987) (stating that the mail fraud statute is a "vehicle for the
prosecution of an almost unlimited number of offenses").
41. See Handakas,286 F.3d at 108 (describing mail fraud as an "all-purpose prosecutorial
expediant"). John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalizationof
FiduciaryBreachesand the Problematic Line Between Law andEthics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 117,
126 (1981) (quoting the prosecutor's maxim, "when in doubt, charge mail fraud"); John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the 'Evolution' of a White-Collar
Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983) (arguing that the mail fraud statute "seems destined to
provide the federal prosecutor with what Archimedes long sought-a simple fulcrum from which
one can move the world"); Jed S. Rakoff, The FederalMail FraudStatute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV.
771, 771 (1980) (noting prosecutors' reference to the statute as "our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our
Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart").
42. See Emery v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F.3d 1343, 1349 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Altman, 48 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Walker, 9 F.3d 1245,
1249 (7th Cir. 1993).
43. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989) (stating the issue is whether the
mailing is part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator); see generallyPeter
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The statute prohibits "devising" a scheme to defraud, so the
government need not prove that the victim actually sustained a loss." The
prosecution must prove, however, that the defendant intended to harm the
victim by depriving the victim of money, property, or honest services.45
Thus, participation in a fraudulent scheme is not a crime unless it was
devised with the specific purpose of defrauding another person. An
aggressive business deal is not criminal even if a person recklessly
disregarded the risk that the scheme will deprive another of money or
property. Nor is taking advantage of accounting standards, or even gaming
those standards, a crime unless undertaken with intent to defraud another
person or entity. Although the intent element is often cited as a significant
hurdle to conviction, this is not necessarily the case. Fact-finders may use
circumstantial evidence to infer culpability.46 The task is made easier when
actual loss occurs because evidence of loss or gain creates an inference of
a specific intent to defraud.47 On the other hand, proving intent is more
problematic when an attempted scheme would not necessarily result in
loss.4"
2. Mail Fraud After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In testament to the effectiveness of the mail and wire fraud statutes,
Congress did not alter the substantive elements of mail and wire fraud. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act does, however, drastically increase penalties of these
crimes. It increases by four times the maximum penalty for mail and wire
fraud, from five to twenty years in prison.49 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also
makes clear that the penalty for conspiracy and attempt to commit fraud is
the same as the penalty for the fraud that is the object of the conspiracy.5"

J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just be Called FederalFraud: The Changing Nature of the Mail
Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435 (1995).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
45. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346.
46. See United States v. Berndt, 86 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Behr, 33
F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hatch, 926 F.2d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 1991).
47. See United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994). See generally
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail FraudMeets Criminal Theory, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1998).
48. See D'Amato, 39 F.3d at 1257.
49. See Sarbanes-Oxicy Act of 2002 § 903, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1343 (2003). The maximum
penalty for these fraud offenses was five years. Id.
50. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 902(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2003). The provision applies
to all Chapter 63 frauds, which include bank fraud, health care fraud, mail and wire fraud, and the
new securities fraud provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2003) (bank fraud); id. § 1347 (health care
fraud); id. § 1348 (securities fraud).
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B. Securities Fraud
Securities fraud is a specialized kind of fraud that applies to
misrepresentations that are made when issuing or trading securities. After
the stock market crash of 1929, the securities laws were enacted in an
effort to restore confidence in the stock market and thereby to encourage
investment. The type of securities fraud dealt with here is prohibited by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which governs trades in secondary
markets and sales of already-issued securities. 5 The law is enforced
through government regulatory actions, implied private causes of action,
and the criminal law.
1. Insider Trading Before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The Exchange Act prohibits the use of manipulative and deceptive
devices in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.52 Rule 1Ob-5,
authorized by the Act, provides more specific prohibitions, such as making
any untrue statement of a material fact in connection with a securities
trade.53 Actors who willfully violate the statute or the rules adopted
51. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (2003). The Securities Act
of 1933 regulates registering and issuing securities in the primary market, requires full disclosure
by companies that sell securities, and contains a criminal provision. See Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (2003).
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2001). Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,....
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
53. Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defrud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
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pursuant to it are subject to criminal penalties.54 The Department of Justice
has sole authority to bring criminal charges," but depends on the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) for referrals.
Perhaps the most common type of criminal securities fraud involves
insider trading.56 Classic insider trading occurs when an insider, such as an
executive of the company, uses information that is not available to the
public to buy or sell a security of that company. Acting in breach of a
fiduciary duty to shareholders, the failure to disclose that material
information to buyers or sellers is considered a "deceptive device. 57 Under
a recent Supreme Court decision, those who do not have a fiduciary
obligation that runs to the buyers or sellers in the trade may also violate
insider trading rules.5" Insider trading now applies to any person who
violates a duty that he or she owes to the source of the nonpublic
information, and thus includes "outsiders."59
In addition to identifying a proper defendant and establishing that the
conduct at issue involved interstate commerce, the government must prove
that the accused acted willfully in possessing and using material, nonpublic
information in a securities trade.6 ° Willfulness has been defined as a
deliberate and intentional act that encompasses fraudulent intent.6
Violators are subject to fines and a maximum penalty of ten years in
prison."

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2003).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2001).
55. Criminal actions are within the exclusive control ofthe Justice Department. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 202.5(f) (2001). The SEC may bring civil or administrative actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3
(2001).
56. See Lynch, supra note 30, at 33 n.31 (remarking on the frequency of insider trading
prosecutions).
57. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,228 (1980). Courts have held that fiduciary
duties run to buyers as well as to sellers of stock on the ground that buyers are prospective
shareholders. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 n.2 (2d Cir. 1991). Tippees of
insiders and temporary insiders, such as attorneys, may also violate insider trading rules. Id. at 565.
58. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997).
59. Id. at 652-53.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2001).
61. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). The definition varies
somewhat between circuits. See United States v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798, 802 n. 13 (I Ith Cir. 1991)
(defining willfulness as deliberate ignorance of truth); United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 787
(9th Cir. 1978) (defining willfulness as reckless indifference to or disregard for truth); see also
William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the FederalSecurities
Laws, 34 Hous. L. REv. 121, 134 n.62, 184 n.300 (1997).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
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2. Insider Trading After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Without otherwise disturbing this prohibition, Sarbanes-Oxley altered
the penalty scheme of the Exchange Act crime: the maximum penalty of
ten years in prison was doubled to twenty years and maximum fines for
individuals were increased from $1,000,000 to $5,000,000.63
In a more significant change, the Act inserted a securities fraud
provision into the federal criminal code.64 The provision prohibits the
knowing execution of (or attempt to execute) "a scheme or artifice to
defraud any person in connection with any security" of a registered or
reporting company.65 The maximum prison term for violating the provision
is twenty-five years.66
The new provision provides prosecutors with greater flexibility and
allows them to operate independently of the SEC.67 It applies to frauds that
are merely in "connection with any security," rather than being restricted
to frauds in sales or purchases.6" The culpability element of the new
securities fraud offense requires knowledge, as opposed to the higher
standard of willfulness in the Exchange Act.6 9 Finally, the new provision
is intended to have a broader application than those offenses, signaled by
its text that mirrors the language of expansively interpreted fraud statutes.
C. Obstruction ofJustice
The federal criminal code addresses obstruction of justice in several
independent and overlapping provisions.7" The common purpose of the
obstruction statutes is to protect the integrity of judicial, administrative,
and legislative proceedings. Accordingly, the provisions ban altering or
destroying documents, offering or promoting false testimony, and
threatening or influencing witnesses, jurors, and court officials. 7' Like
63. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1106, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2003) (authorizing
maximum fine for corporations of $25 million).
64. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2003).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1348(1) (2003). The provision also includes a false pretense subsection
which bars obtaining money or property by means of false pretenses in connection with the
purchase or sale of a registered or reporting company. Id. § 1348(2).
66. Id.
67. See Legislative History of Title VIII ofHR 2673: The Sarbanes-OxleyAct of2002, 148
CONG. REc. S7421 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy that the bill creates a "more
general and less technical provision" that is "intended to provide needed enforcement flexibility").
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1348. Note that the new provision is somewhat narrower in that it applies
only to registered securities or those of issuers required to file reports with the SEC. Id.
69. This standard may be the operational equivalent of willfulness in some circuits. See supra
note 61 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1510, 1512 (2003).
71. Id. § 1503(a). In addition to banning specific obstructive conduct, the statutes contain
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perjury and false statements, obstruction is a "cover-up" crime that arises
from an attempt to conceal evidence of earlier illegal activity.
1. Obstruction Before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The obstruction offense of which the firm Arthur Andersen was
convicted generally prohibits interfering or tampering with witnesses,
victims, or informants.72 Among other acts, section 1512(b) prohibits
"corruptly persuad[ing]" another person to alter, destroy, mutilate or
conceal an object with intent to impair the object's integrity or availability
for use in an official proceeding.73 The culpability element, "corruptly
persuad[ing]," exists when the actor is motivated by an inappropriate or
improper purpose to convince someone else to obstruct justice.74 An
"official proceed[ing]" is any proceeding before a federal court, grand jury,
congressional hearing, or federal agency.75 In Arthur Andersen's case, the
proceeding was an announced SEC investigation.76 The maximum
punishment authorized by section 1512(b) was, until passage of SarbanesOxley, ten years in prison and/or statutory fines.77
2. Obstruction After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In reaction to the wholesale shredding at Enron by the Arthur Andersen
auditors, Congress added three new laws prohibiting conduct that
undermines government investigations. First, Sarbanes-Oxley amends the
obstruction statute under which Duncan and Arthur Andersen were
convicted so that it now applies to those individuals who actually
destroyed documents.78 This provision thus moves beyond witness
tampering and corruptly persuading. Specifically applying to documents,
the new provision makes it a crime for anyone to corruptly alter, destroy,
mutilate, or conceal a record or document with intent to impair its use in
an official proceeding.79 In the Duncan/Arthur Andersen scenario, those

broad omnibus clauses that bar any endeavor to interfere with the judicial system. See id. §§ 1503,
1505; United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598 (1995) (noting that the omnibus clause of section
1503 "serves as a catchall, prohibiting persons from endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or impede
the due administration of justice").
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a).
73. Id. § 1512(b)(2)(B). Subsection (b) also applies to witness testimony. Id. § 1512(b)(1)(2).
74. See United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2001).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1) (2001).
76. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, No. H-02-121 (D. Tex. filed Mar. 7, 2002)
(Indictment).
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).
78. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1102, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (2003).
79. Id. The provision also contains an omnibus provision. Id. § 1512(c)(2).
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employees who corruptly shredded documents would now face criminal
punishment. Violators are subject to statutory fines and a maximum term
of twenty years in prison-twice the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley term of the
Duncan/Arthur Andersen offense. 0
Sarbanes-Oxley also adds two independent obstruction provisions to
the federal criminal code. One new provision creates the crime of
obstructing a federal investigation of"any matter" and specifically includes
bankruptcy proceedings.8 ' Prosecutors must establish two culpability
elements: (1) the accused knowingly acted (altered, destroyed, etc.), and
(2) acted with an intent to impede, obstruct, or influence a federal
investigation. 2 Violators are subject to fines and a maximum of twenty
years in prison. 3 Its application to any kind of document and any matter
in a greater range of investigations adds considerably more breadth to the
document provisions.
Finally, a second independent obstruction provision requires "[a]ny
accountant" to maintain audit documents and workpapers for five years. 4
Knowing and willful violations of this obligation subjects the actor to fines
and/or up to ten years in prison. 5 The prohibition is not contingent on an
investigation or official proceeding, but is a flat directive to maintain
documents, and is enforced through criminal sanctions.8 6
The new obstruction statutes differ from one another and from existing
provisions in their culpability elements, the inclusion of attempts, and the
character of the proceeding. Nevertheless, there is significant overlap
between these offenses, and their ultimate usefulness is uncertain.

80. Id. § 1512(c).

81. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2003) provides:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or
makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or
any case filed under title I1, or inrelation to or contemplation of any such matter
or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1) (2003).
85. Id. § 1520(b). The criminal provision includes violating rules promulgated by the SEC
to implement the obligation. Id. § 1520(a)(2).
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)-(b).
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D. Sarbanes-Oxley's New Obligations
The criminal provisions discussed thus far cannot be characterized as
"new" in the sense of imposing different obligations on businesspersons
and corporations. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act does, however, create two
obligations that have not been directly subject to criminal enforcement.
First, chief executives and chief financial officers must personally certify
that reports filed with the SEC comply with regulatory requirements.8 7 An
executive who knowingly certifies financial statements that do not fairly
present the firm's financial condition is subject to a maximum fine of one
million dollars and a prison term of ten years, or both."8 When the
executive acts willfully, maximum penalties are increased to five million
dollars and twenty years in prison. 9
The second new obligation created by Sarbanes-Oxley protects
employees who report wrongful conduct internally or to external
investigators.9" Under the Act, whistleblowers may file civil suits for
damages resulting from retaliatory acts. 9' Moreover, executives who
knowingly and intentionally retaliate against whistleblowers are subject to
criminal fines and a maximum of ten years in prison.92 This provision is
intended to encourage employees to inform federal agencies and internal
gatekeepers about suspected wrongful conduct. Accordingly, it provides
attorneys fees to informers to aid in enforcing the new right.93
Nevertheless, the new provision may not be as effective at encouraging
whistleblowing as it might have been.94 Congress provided no incentive,
such as a financial reward or punitive damages, that would stimulate

87. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a) (2003). Before passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley, executives could be liable for inaccurate financial reports under a fraud theory. See
Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a CEO who signed
an inaccurate SEC filing was liable under § 10(b)). The Securities Act of 1933 also requires
corporate officers to sign registration statements and provides a cause of action if the statements are
misleading. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(a) (2003).

88. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1).
89. Id. § 1350(c)(2).
90. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 806, 1107, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A, 1513 (2003).
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1514A (providing cause of action for wage-related damages and special
damages such as attorneys fees).
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e).
93. Id. § 1514A(c)(2)(C).
94. Early reports were not encouraging. See Fawn H. Johnson, Whistlemakers: Lawmakers
Decry Bush'sInterpretationof Whistleblower Protectionsin New Law, 148 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
A-4 (Aug. 1, 2002) (reporting Bush administration's decision to limit applicability of the
provision).
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reporting.9" Moreover, claims must be brought within a short ninety days
of the retaliatory act. 96
II. AN EVALUATION OF SARBANES-OXLEY'S
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted to protect investors by improving
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures relating to securities
laws. 97 Enacted in haste and out of political expediency,9" it was an effort
to restore confidence in securities markets in a sagging economy. Although
the Act focuses on the administrative regulatory scheme, especially as to
accounting standards, the criminal law is to play a major role in the effort
to eradicate corporate fraud. President Bush emphasized the law's strong
criminal component at the signing ceremony: there is "[n]o more easy
money for corporate criminals, just hard time." 99 He later reinforced that
characterization: "If you're a CEO and you think you can fudge the books
in order to make yourself look better, we're going to find you, we're going
to arrest you and we're going to hold you to account."' 00

95. In contrast, qui tam actions brought under the False Claims Act provide substantial
monetary rewards for whistleblowing. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2003); see generally Joan H. Krause,
Health CareProvidersandthe Public Fisc: Paradigms ofGovernment Harm Under the Civil False
Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121 (2001).
The federal government has recovered approximately $8.7 billion from fraudulent contractors
since 1986. See JACK MEYER & STEPHANIE E. ANTHONY, REDUCING HEALTH CARE FRAUD: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 11 (Sept. 2001), available at
www.taf.org/publications/PDF/reducing.pdf.
Following misconduct at savings and loan institutions in the 1980s, rewards for whistleblowers
rather than mere protection were recommended. See Maria S. Boss & Barbara Crutchfield George,
Challenging Conventional Views of White Collar Crime, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 32, 55-56 (1992).
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
97. See Preface to Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
President Bush characterized the Act as embodying "the most far-reaching reforms of American
business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt." Signing Statement of President
George W. Bush, (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases
/2002/07/2002730.htmi (last visited May 8, 2003).
98. See Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 Hous. L.
REV. 1, 46 (2003) (noting that neither publicly held corporations, the political parties, nor
organizations and individuals interested in matters of corporate governance were able to study or
seriously consider the bill).
The administration resisted reform legislation, but in the end supported it in response to reports
that the business scandals were eroding its political support. See Stephen Labaton, Handcuffs Make
Strange Politics, You Say? But Not in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at CI (noting that
a public backlash prompted a sharp about-face at the White House).
99. Signing Statement, supra note 97.
100. Mike Allen, Bush Pledges More Corporate Fraud Arrests, WASH. POST, July 30, 2002,
at AI0.
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A. Substantive CriminalLaws and Enforcement
Sarbanes-Oxley did not create radically new substantive offenses or
realize genuine change in existing legal standards. Thus, one of the more
interesting points about Sarbanes-Oxley is what Congress did not do.
The standards embodied in the federal fraud statutes were not
disturbed; their broad proscription against devising a scheme to defraud
already captured a wide range of fraudulent conduct, making it
unnecessary to define a new type of fraud. The new securities fraud
provision also does not add new substantive law; it is best viewed as
codifying the practice endorsed by federal courts that treats securities fraud
as a variant of mail or wire fraud offenses. Similarly, the new obstruction
provisions refine existing statutes that have been used successfully by
prosecutors, as evidenced by the convictions of David Duncan and Arthur
Andersen."'l The new obligations that relate to certification and retaliation
against whistleblowers do not address underlying criminal behavior, but
deal instead with its aftermath. Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley does not
fundamentally change the substantive criminal standards that govern
corporate insiders.
Having said that, it would be unwise to underestimate the significance
of the criminal provisions. Sarbanes-Oxley strengthens the enforcement
power of Justice Department prosecutors and SEC regulators, and thereby
increases the exposure of corporate managers and directors to criminal
sanctions. To the extent that the new crimes utilize the lower culpability
element of knowing conduct rather than willful conduct, criminality will
be easier to establish at trial. 0 2 Similarly, the executive certification
requirement will make it easier to establish fraudulent conduct if its effect
is to eliminate the defenses of lack of knowledge or good faith. Requiring
officer certification and encouraging whistleblowers, along with other
provisions, 10 3 should result in an increased flow of information to
investigating agencies. Nevertheless, although buttressing enforcement
efforts is an important initiative, the major function of the criminal law

101. See supra notes 3 & 72 and accompanying text.
102. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (requiring the culpability element of"knowingly" for the new
securities fraud provision) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 18j(b) & 78ff (requiring the element of "willfully").
103. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 305, 15 U.S.C. 77t & 78u (2003); § 306, 29 U.S.C.
1021 & 1132 (2003); § 307. Section 307 obliges attorneys to disclose suspected wrongdoing. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307; see also Leslie Griffin, Whistleblowing in the Corporate
Context, in BALA DHARAN & NANCY RAPOPORT, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 36, on file with author) (explaining attorney's
obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC rules). Title III (Corporate Responsibility) and Title IV
(Enhanced Financial Disclosure) of the Act generally impose more obligations on firms and officers
and give the SEC increased administrative authority. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 tits. III & IV.
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under Sarbanes-Oxley is to deter future crime through the threat of severe
punishment.
B. The Penalty Provisions
The overwhelming characteristic of Sarbanes-Oxley's new criminal
provisions is the severity of its prison terms.'0 4 For the individuals
involved, the certification offense carries a maximum penalty of twenty
years' o5 and the whistleblower statute has a ten year penalty.° 6 Similarly,
the new obstruction provisions carry ten and twenty year terms, 10 7 an
increase of 200% in the offense for which Arthur Andersen was convicted.
The penalties for mail and wire fraud were increased by 400%. '0 The
maximum prison term for insider trading was increased from ten to twentyfive years, a 250% increase.'0 9 Conspiracy to commit such fraud carries
twenty and twenty-five year penalties-an increase of at least 400%. "' In
cases of fraud involving pensions, penalties were increased 1000%, the
maximum term of imprisonment rising from one year to ten years."' These
punishment schemes are comparable to such heinous crimes as attempted
murder, which carries a maximum of twenty years in prison; torture, which
of a
carries a maximum punishment of twenty years, and sexual abuse
2
years."
fifteen
of
punishment
maximum
a
minor, which carries
104. The approach contrasts markedly with amendments to the mail and wire fraud statutes that
followed the savings and loan scandals of the 1980s, which increased penalties only for frauds that
involved financial institutions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003) (providing maximum of thirty years
in prison and/or fines of up to $1,000,000 for frauds involving a financial institution).
105. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906(c)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003).
106. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2003).
107. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2003).
108. One report sheds light on the fourfold increase in maximum prison terms for mail and
wire fraud. See Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & Stephanie R. Pratt, Sarbanes-Oxley: New Ways to Solve Old
Crimes, 9 Bus. CRIMES BULL. 1 (2002). In April 2002, the House refused to increase prison
sentences for mail and wire fraud. Id. By July, as the scandal and public outrage peaked, the White
House successfully urged the Senate to double the maximum sentence to ten years. Id. The House,
not to be outdone, then doubled that penalty, resulting in the maximum twenty year prison term.
Id.
109. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2003).
110. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 902, 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2003).
111. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 904,29 U.S.C. § 1131 (2003) (Employee Retirement
Income Security Act). Criminal fines are increased from $5,000 to $100,000 and in the case of
organizations, from $100,000 to $500,000. Id.
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (2003) (attempted murder, maximum of twenty years in prison);
id. § 2340A (torture, twenty years); id. § 2243 (sexual abuse of a minor, fifteen years); id. § 11
(2003) (assault with a deadly weapon, twenty years); id. § 1112 (2003) (voluntary manslaughter,
ten years).
As Ira Lee Sorkin, former federal prosecutor and director of the New York office of the SEC
put it: "If a CEO commits a willful fraud, he can get 25 years. If he commits manslaughter, he's
going to get 15." See Alex Berenson, A US. Pushon Accounting Fraud,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,2003,
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The extraordinarily severe penalties of Sarbanes-Oxley are a telling
indication of the depth of public outrage and the seriousness with which
the community regards fraud and other corporate misconduct. But how
likely is it that more severe penalties will deter similar conduct in the
future? Raising prison terms by 400% is unlikely to result in a 400%
increase in deterrence; at best, it will result in some marginal degree of
deterrence." 3 Moreover, raising prison terms may have no effect at all. As
a former SEC official remarked, "[i]f they're willing to risk five years,
they're going to risk [ten] years.""' 4
The criminal charges brought thus far against Enron executives
demonstrate that there was no scarcity of criminal laws "on the books."
The federal fraud statutes are universally recognized as flexible tools that
offer inclusive and comprehensive application. Penalties for fraud and
obstruction, while not as draconian as sanctions under Sarbanes-Oxley,
were already significant, especially when coupled with money laundering
and RICO charges. Finally, the Sentencing Guidelines ensure a certain
term of imprisonment." 5
at CI.
113. The magnitude of effect is measured not only by time in jail, but also by other factors
such as age. Consider a thirty-year-old felon who is expected to live to age eighty. With a five year
sentence, the thirty-year-old will have forty-five free years of life. With a twenty year sentence, our
felon can expect thirty free years, or two-thirds as much. In contrast, a fifty-year-old serving a five
year sentence would have twenty-five free years, while a twenty year sentence would allow only ten
free years. I am grateful to Roger Sherman, Professor of Economics, University of Houston, who
provided this example. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and
Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1999)
(explaining that cost of imprisonment to the offender declines over time).
114. Marcia Coyle, Tough New Laws-Substance or Show?, NAT'LL.J., July 22, 2002, at Al;
see also Floyd Norris, How Pitt Could Make Fraud Less Tempting, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2002, at
CI (writing that "the possibility of long prison terms won't end corporate fraud any more than it
has halted the sale of heroin").
These common sense notions are corroborated by research. See Erling Eide, Economics of
Criminal Behavior, in V ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 345 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) [hereinafter V ENCYCLOPEDIA] (presenting various explanations of
criminal behavior).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34 (discussing Guidelines). The Sentencing
Commission has issued temporary guidelines and called for comments before permanently adopting
them in November 2003. See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Commission
Stiffens Penalties for White Collar Criminals (Jan. 8, 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
PRESS/rel010803.htm.
To avoid the unintended result of skewing penalties for those frauds that do not result in
widespread harm, the temporary guidelines resist an overall increase in penalties for fraud. See Eric
Lichtblau, Panel Clears Harsher Terms in Corporate Crime Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at
CI (noting that the measures raise penalties for frauds involving great sums of money).
This approach has been criticized by the Justice Department, which is aggressively lobbying
for a more comprehensive overall increase in the penalty scheme for fraud. See Eric Lichtblau, Bush
Officials Vowing to Seek Tough Penalties in Wall St. Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 2002, at C 1.
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Yet longstanding federal criminal laws, substantial penalties, and
increased certainty of punishment did not deter serious business
misconduct at an astonishing number of corporations. Wrongdoers were
not deterred by the possibility of contact with the criminal justice system's
enforcement agents and mechanisms-judges, prosecutors, police officers,
courtrooms, fingerprinting, perp walks, and bail hearings. Nor were they
deterred by the stigma and societal condemnation that attaches to a felony
conviction or even to an indictment." 6 Instead, they forfeited their
reputations and their standing in the local and national business
community. This evidence suggests that penal sanctions alone will not
prevent future Enrons. With these considerations in place, the following
discussion surveys the role of criminal law in encouraging law-abiding
behavior and applies those models of law-abiding behavior to the corporate
setting.
III. USING CRIMINAL LAW TO ENCOURAGE LAW-ABIDING
BUSINESS CONDUCT

Criminal law is thought to encourage law-abiding behavior in two
ways: people either comply with the law after a conscious evaluation of the
risks of disobeying it or they comply out of an unconscious instinct to obey
the law. The two models are counterposed as external or internal control
mechanisms, as instrumental or normative, and based on either self-interest
or moral values. In the case of Enron, neither conscious calculation nor
unconscious instinct appears to have operated to prevent harmful and
immoral conduct.
A. A Conscious Choice to Obey the Law
The rational choice theory of law-abiding behavior suggests that people
comply with the law because they decide, after a calculation of the likely
costs and benefits of the crime, to forego the criminal conduct." 7 This

116. As a colleague wryly remarked on the day the Houston Chronicle's front page featured
a picture of Andrew Fastow in handcuffs, "How much would it be worth to keep your son from
seeing that?"
Reputations are not always destroyed by felony convictions. See John Markoff, Poindexter's
Still a Technocrat, Still a Lightning Rod, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 2003, at CI (reporting that
Poindexter, convicted on five felony counts that were overturned on procedural grounds, is
currently heading the Pentagon's Total Information Awareness project).
117. This utilitarian theory rests on the work of Jeremy Bentham and is associated with law
and economics scholars. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J.POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (updating Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian model of criminal
law); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a PreferenceShaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. I (explaining how criminal law promotes social norms of
individual behavior by shaping the preferences of criminals and the general population); Richard
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calculation of risk includes the likelihood of being caught and the severity
of punishment. To achieve an optimal level of deterrence, the community
could increase enforcement efforts, thus increasing the likelihood of
detection. Or theoretically, the community could achieve the same level of
prevention by increasing the penalties for those who are caught and
convicted." 8 Although it may be less expensive to choose severe penalties
over enforcement, this strategy is less than fair because it intends that only
'some offenders will be punished. The severe penalties of Sarbanes-Oxley's
criminal provisions appear to reflect the core proposition that increasing
the severity of the penalty is an efficient and effective way to deter future
crime.
The role played by the criminal law in this model is coercive: lawabiding behavior is achieved through threats of punishment and disgrace.
Research supports the suggestion that behavior may be shaped to some
degree by estimates of the likelihood and severity of punishment." 9 Other
studies suggest, however, that this calculation has only a minor influence
and that law-abiding behavior is only weakly correlated to the risk of
punishment. 2 ' The following discussion reviews refinements to the
rational choice theory and certain characteristics of white collar crime,
both of which reveal that increasing the severity of criminal penalties may
not deter business misconduct.
1. A More Complete Rational Choice Model
The rational choice theory of law-abiding behavior has some resonance
in the area of business crime.' White collar crimes typically require
A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985) (suggesting
that distinctive substantive doctrines ofcriminal law promote economic efficiency); Steven Shavell,
CriminalLaw and the Optimal Use ofNonmonetary Sanctionsas a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1232 (1985) (presenting theoretical model that indicates that the purpose ofnonmonetary sanctions
is deterrence and analyzing their efficient use).
118. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, in V
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 307.
119. See, e.g., Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes
Punishableby Imprisonment,4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479 (1975).
120. See Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public
Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating
Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 707, 712-13 (2000) (summarizing research results).
121. See Sally S. Simpson & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Low Self-Control, Organizational
Theory, and CorporateCrime, 36 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 509, 539-44 (2002) (providing an extensive
bibliography of studies applying the theory to white collar and corporate crime).
For other articles that focus on punishment of white collar criminals, see generally Dan M.
Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-CollarCriminals:A ProposalforReform of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECoN. 365 (1999); John R. Lott, Jr., Do We Punish High Income
CriminalsToo Heavily?, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 583 (1992); Richard A. Posner, OptimalSentencesfor
White-CollarCriminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409 (1980); Joel Waldfogel, Are Fines andPrison
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advance planning, which provides an opportunity for reflection and an
assessment of the risk of detection and punishment.' 22 Yet the individuals
at Enron apparently never made that calculation or, if they did, grossly
underestimated the risk that their business dealings implicated criminal
laws and punishment. Behavioral economists and psychologists offer
insights that explain such behavior 12and
that identify limitations of the
3
rational choice theory of deterrence.
Individuals differ in their tendencies to be optimistic and confident in
their ability to control future events. A few are so optimistic and confident
that their ability to assess reality becomes impaired and amounts to a
judgment bias. 124 Such individuals also may operate from an inflated sense
of self-esteem that assigns success to skill and failure to bad luck. 25 Biased
judgment, over-confidence, and an inflated sense of self-esteem interfere
with the capacity to perceive risk. Yet the rational choice theory of
motivation for law-abiding behavior depends upon the actor's realization
that planned conduct might result in punishment. Whether characterized
as self-deception, hubris, or biased judgment, some individuals may not
recognize that their behavior is approaching, or even crossing, the line that
separates lawful from unlawful conduct. Thus, they either do not calculate
the risks of their behavior or, if they do balance costs and benefits, they
may not assess the risk accurately.
Overconfidence, optimism, and resulting misjudgments also may
postpone the timing of a rational calculation until it is too late. Market
Terms Used Efficiently? Evidence on Federal Fraud Offenders, 38 J.L. & ECON. 107 (1995).
122. See Brown, supra note 23, at 1325 (noting that deterrence theory seems appropriate in
the context of corporate wrongdoing); Lynch, supra note 30, at 45 (noting the probability that
rational calculation is more common in white collar context than in others).
123. See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982) (presenting essays by economists and psychologists on how people make
decisions); Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental
Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999); Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and
Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q. J. ECON. 585 (1995); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral
Theories ofJudgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1499, 1500-02 (1998) (providing summary of recent scholarship in the field). Daniel
Kahneman received a Nobel Prize in economics in 2002 for his work in the emerging field of
behavioral economics.
124. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of HyperCompetitions: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 968
(2002) [hereinafter Organizational Psychology] (applying psychological research to competitive
firms); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997)
(suggesting that some executives may be more confident about their ability to control future events
than an objective evaluation of the situation calls for).
125. See Langevoort, Organizational Psychology, supra note 124, at 969-71; Larry E.
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 19-22 (2002).
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situations change constantly, and the environment that presented a modest
risk yesterday may turn to catastrophe today. By the time an executive
understands the full implications of risky or aggressive dealings, the
situation is precarious.' 26 Unless the deception is continued, the firm will
fail to meet investor and market expectations. The alternate course of
action, disclosure, brings certain disgrace. In an excess of confidence, the
executive embarks on a third option, to continue in the same course of
conduct. 27
'
Biased judgment does notjustify or excuse criminal conduct, but it may
explain why the deterrence model of criminal law does not always prevent
criminal behavior. In the case of Enron, observers note that optimism, selfconfidence, and risk-taking were hallmarks of the corporate culture and
were rewarded.'28 The point for our purposes is that realization, and thus
a calculation, of risk can be totally absent or come well after harmful
conduct begins. When realization comes, the overconfident actor may
rationally decide to continue the deception in the hope that the crisis will
pass.
2. An Impediment from White Collar Crime
The second impediment that stands in the way of the operation of the
rational choice model lies in the nature of white collar crime. Compared
to other forms of criminal activity, white collar crime is famously written
in shades of gray.' 29 In this realm, conduct that is immoral or harmful is not

126. See Ribstein,supra note 125, at 21 (suggesting that hyper-motivated and super-optimistic
insiders could persuade themselves that any setbacks were temporary and that cover-ups needed
only to work for a short time).
127. See id. at 22-23 (suggesting also that views about the accuracy of stock prices play a role
in a decision to "ride-out" a stock price that is considered inaccurately low).
128. See infra Part III.C.
129. Cf As Chief Justice Burger commented on antitrust law: "[T]he behavior proscribed by
the [Sherman] Act is often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and
economically justifiable business conduct." United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 44041 (1978).
In the context of bribery, see Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate
Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784 (1985) (noting that corruption blurs into accepted
practice). For a historical perspective, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984). See also United
States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 741-42 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating in fraud case involving bribery that
the line between "unattractive and actually criminal conduct is blurred"). In the context of federal
conspiracy law, see the classic treatment by Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the
United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
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always criminal fraud, 3 ' while conduct that is not obviously immoral or
harmful may be criminal fraud.13 '
One of the chief distinctions between white collar crime and other
crimes is that often neither the accused nor the prosecutor knows whether
a criminal act has occurred, even after conduct has been identified. 32 Laws
are broadly written in nonspecific, general terms in order to capture a broad
range of conduct. One result is that such laws fail to provide notice that
certain conduct is criminal. In the context of fraud, ambiguous and vague
statutory prohibitions can reach such proportions as to implicate the
constitutional requirement of fair notice.'33 What we deal with here is the
pragmatic effect of vague prohibitions: if individuals do not realize that
their conduct is criminal or even borders on it, they will not engage in a
rational calculation.
These observations are not offered to justify or excuse criminal
conduct. It has long been established that the community may subject those
who work within certain industries to proscriptions whose moral content
is not written in black ink.' 34 Nevertheless, the ambiguous nature of many
130. For instance, executives with sensitive corporate information who sold stock according
to pre-arranged trading plans probably do not violate insider trading laws, even when they possess
information about the falling value of the company. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-1 (2003); see also
United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660,662 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that infraud cases "greed and
criminal liability are not necessarily synonymous").
131. See Cochran, 109 F.3d at 662. Consider the extensive literature that seeks to explain why
insider trading is a crime. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD,
AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW (1996); Kim Lane Scheppele, "It'sJustNot Right ": The Ethics
ofInsider Trading, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1993).
132. See Pamela H. Bucy, CorporateEthos: A StandardforImposing CorporateCriminal

Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1147 (1991) (providing examples). Immoral and harmful
conduct, even when all facts are established, may not constitute mail or wire fraud. See, e.g., United
States v. Cleveland, 531 U.S. 12, 16 (2000); United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir.
2002); United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1558 (1Ith Cir. 1996).
133. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraudand the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone
to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 190-97 (1994) (discussing legality, notice, and

vagueness in context of honest services fraud). Recent opinions have reconsidered the issue of
vagueness in mail and wire fraud. See Handakas, 286 F.3d at 96 (stating that if it were the first
panel to address the issue, it would find honest services mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1346)
unconstitutionally facially vague and finding its application in present case was void for vagueness);
United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2002) (agreeing fully with the Handakas
panel's observations concerning the vagueness of the term honest services, but finding statute was
not unconstitutionally vague as applied) (currently being reconsidered en banc); United States v.
Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1997) (conceding that some defendants "on the outer reaches
of the [wire fraud] statute" may be without notice); United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069,
1077 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting defendant in wire fraud case was without notice that his actions could
lead to criminal sanctions).
134. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (affirming conviction of chief
executive officer of supermarket chain for the strict liability offense of food adulteration); United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-82 (1943).
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white collar offenses may explain the failure of criminal penalties to deter
recent business misconduct. Unless individuals recognize that proposed
conduct triggers criminal sanctions, they will not pause to evaluate the risk
of detection and punishment. Even if they do pause to calculate such risks,
judgment biases may impair that evaluation.
Another limitation of the rational choice model lies in the difficulty of
enforcing white collar crimes. In addition to the ambiguity of conduct that
can confuse prosecutors as well as the accused,' it simply is difficult to
ferret out fraud. Fraud occurs in secret, often by those who are able to
control and conceal information that might lead to detection. The inherent
difficulty of identifying fraudulent conduct affects the rational calculation
made by corporate actors, who may accurately assess the chances of
detection as slim. Yet if criminal penalties are increased enough to account
for a low probability of detection, the penalties are likely to reach
unacceptable levels.' The point here is not to debate the fairness issues
inherent in increasing punishment as opposed to enforcement efforts, but
merely to note another impediment to the rational choice model. Taken
together, the new behavioral theories and the problems regarding
enforcement of white collar crimes suggest greater attention be paid to the
second theory of law-abiding behavior.
B. An Unconscious Instinct to Obey the Law
The second theory that explains how criminal law supports law-abiding
behavior suggests that people obey the law without conscious reflection,
because of an instinct to do the right thing.'37 The role of the criminal law
in this model is to embody and communicate the social norm of the
community that defines "the right thing." This model posits that law-

135. See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that
government had indicted the wrong party to the fraud).
136. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,
463 (1997) (calculating that, when only 1.6 % of burglars go to prison, a 250 year sentence is
necessary to deter burglary and to keep the quantum of punishment around that of a four year
sentence).
137. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME
(1995) (investigating ordinary peoples' notions about criminal liability and punishment); ToM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (presenting research that explores reasons for lawabiding behavior); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.

REV. 349 (1997) (explaining phenomena of social influence and social meaning and identifying
their implications for criminal law); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and

Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) (advocating use of norms, defined as informal
social regularities, in economic analysis of the law); Robinson & Darley, supra note 136
(examining role of criminal law in creating and maintaining community norms); Tyler & Darley,
supra note 120 (applying psychological models of social values to creation of a law-abiding

society).
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abiding behavior results when individuals have internalized the prevailing
social norms and are, in effect, self-regulators.138 In contrast to the rational
choice theory, which relies on 3external
social control, this model is based
9
on an internal control system.
Individuals gradually develop personal codes ofconduct at a young age
through interactions with other individuals in their family, school, and
social circles. 4 A person has internalized a social norm when it has
become part of the internal motivation system that guides individual
behavior even in the absence of external authority.' Individuals then
unconsciously regulate their behavior so that it is consistent with the
internal principles and values by which they define themselves.' 42
In this model, criminal laws and their enforcement communicate
societal standards, and violations trigger universal condemnation. Laws
thus have
an educative function that influences the development of
43
norms.1
1. The Limitations of the Social Norm Model
The social norm model, like the rational choice model, has inherent
limitations that impede its effectiveness in encouraging law-abiding
138. A related theory suggests that people obey the law because they fear the disapproval of
their social group. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 136, at 468 (noting that social scientists
categorize compliance as produced by social influence or internalized morals standards). This
theory seems to be inherent in both the rational choice and internalized value models. As to rational
choice, individuals would consider disgrace and stigmatization as a cost of criminal conduct. As
to the self-regulated, internalized norm theory, individuals have internalized the external social
control of the community.
139. See Tyler & Darley, supra note 120, at 714 (stating that behavior is determined by a set
of internal values about the morality of behavior).
140. See id. at 718 (noting that children are trained by a powerful socialization process into
internalizing the beliefs represented in the culture to which they belong).
141. Id. at 715 (quoting Martin L. Hoffman, Moral Internalization: Current Theory and
Research, in 10 ADVANCES INEXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 85, 85-86 (Leonard Berkowitz

ed. 1977)).
142. See id. at 714 (contrasting internalized social values with the contemporaneous, selfinterested calculations of the rational choice model). It has been suggested that external directives,
such as legal prohibitions through criminal law, are not as effective in guiding conduct as
internalized moral codes. Id. at 717.
143. See Johannes Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCL 176, 179-80 (1952) (noting secondary effects of punishment include
forming and strengthening the public's moral code); Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The
Use of CriminalSanctions in the Enforcement ofEconomic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17
STAN. L. REV. 197, 220 (1965) (claiming that "social sanctions can be used to change beliefs,
attitudes, and personal values and goals"); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean
"Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 193, 200 (1991) ("[T]he public learns what is blameworthy in large part from what is
punished.").

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss4/1

26

Moohr: An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Co
THE MODEST ROLE OF CRIMINAL LAWIN PREVENTING CORPORATE CRIME

behavior. The commonly-held notion that it is difficult to instill moral
values and ethical codes solely through law 44 is supported by studies
indicating that criminal law does not directly influence individual
behavior.'45 The effect of criminal law on individuals seems to be indirect
and attenuated; at best it influences and strengthens the norms of the social
group, which individuals then internalize.' 46 In the end, criminal laws may
have a greater impact on reinforcing behavior of the good citizen than
changing behavior of the bad citizen.' 47
The criminal law is not, however, without influence on people.
Criminal laws may indirectly influence individuals by confirming and
maintaining existing values."' Further, values are not frozen in childhood
experience; encounters with the law in adulthood probably have some
influence, albeit reduced, on the formation of individual norms. 4 9 This
notion emphasizes the significance of even-handed enforcement and
interest-free, transparent legislation. If the system is viewed as morally
credible and legitimate, individuals tend to obey the law in marginal
situations when conduct is ambiguous or of borderline criminality. 5 ° If
people respect the criminal law system, they are likely to defer to the
authority of the law even in the absence of a strong internalized norm. But
of course, criminal laws, or for that matter laws in general, are not the only
influences on behavior.
2. The Influence of Subgroups
The public outrage that followed disclosure of Enron's true financial
condition demonstrates general community views about the conduct of
144. See Robert Prentice, An EthicsLessonfor BusinessSchools, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 2002,
at A19 (stating that if students did not get a sense of right and wrong from their families or their
faith, it is unlikely a business school professor can instill it); Jeffrey L. Seglin, Will More Rules
Yield Better CorporateBehavior?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at BU4 ("[y]ou don't legislate
morality," quoting David A. Nadler, chairman of a New York consulting firm).
145. Robinson & Darley, supra note 136, at 470-71 (citing research by Harold Grasmick &
Donald Green, Harold Grasmick & Robert Bursik, Raymond Paternoster & Lee Ann lovanni,
Robert Meir & Weldon Johnson, and Tom Tyler).
146. See id. at 471-77 (explaining influence of criminal law on social forces that produce
compliance).
147. See Lynch, supra note 30, at 46-47 (noting the need for occasional reminders that societyat-large continues to abide by shared norms, which provide respect for the good and shame for the
bad).
148. See Michael C. Harper, Comment on The Tort/Crime Distinction:A GenerationLater,
76 B.U. L. REv. 23, 25 (1996) (stating that the "more significant" educative force of criminal law
"operates not to change morals or values, but rather to confirm them in such a way as to insure that
they become more deeply internalized or inculcated in the public psyche").
149. Tyler & Darley, supra note 120, at 717-18 (noting people also are influenced by their
adult experiences).
150. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 136, at 468.
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Enron's officers. The alleged conduct at Enron-insider trading,
misleading investors, misstating financial results-is viewed by most as
immoral, harmful, and blameworthy. Yet the conduct of the Enron actors
suggests that they had not internalized this community norm against selfdealing and manipulative behavior. Even when a person understands that
others would condemn certain conduct, or knows that certain behavior is
prohibited, he or she may not have internalized the underlying value in a
way that changes behavior.'' Then those individuals will not instinctively
constrain themselves and may even adopt values that are contrary to those
of the greater community.
Although we speak of the "community" to mean the entire citizenry,
that "community" is actually made up of various groups.152 Opinions about
wrongdoing can vary with positions of individuals in the social structure
of the community. Thus, general social norms may not be shared by
specific subgroups, and corporate cultures may form a localized culture
that is distinct from the mainstream. Individuals, whether executives or
ordinary employees, may be influenced by a specific corporate culture.
Companies may develop distinctive characteristics that set them apart
from their counterparts.'53 Indeed, a specific business culture may embrace
values that are inimical to those of the greater community and may even
encourage its members to break the law. 54 Loyal individuals may also be
motivated by a conviction that their actions are good for the company. In
that case, they are even less likely to consider those acts as dangerously
close to unlawful.' Moreover, when the subgroup is strong and cohesive,
efforts to stigmatize certain conduct by applying criminal law may even be
counterproductive." 6

151. See Coffee, supra note 143, at 232 (noting the distinction between knowing what the
public morality is and internalizing that morality).
152. See Ball & Friedman, supra note 143, at 207 (commenting on various conceptions of the
"public" and pointing out the infirmity of relying on notions of "prevailing morality").
153. See Bucy, supra note 132, at 1123-25 (providing research of organizational theorists to
this effect).
154. See id. at 1127-50 (providing factors that define corporate ethos). For an example from
current events, see Floyd Norris & Diana B. Henriques, 3 Admit Guilt in Falsifying CUC'sBooks,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2000, at CI (explaining that fraud at Cendant was a result of"a culture that
had been developing over many years" that was ingrained in employees by superiors).
The demand ofshareholders for high profits may also encourage aggressive dealings that border
on negligent or criminal conduct. The effect of American companies' emphasis on maximizing
shareholder profits also poses other dilemmas. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE
IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT 4-11 (2001).
155. See Ribstein, supranote 125, at 21 (noting that actors who are convinced they "are doing
the right thing" in maintaining their company's value may not be subject to moral constraints).
156. See Kahan, supra note 13 7, at 373-77 (recounting experience of authorities with juvenile
gangs); Robinson & Darley, supra note 137, at 481 (stating that the use of stigmatization in absence
of consensus about morality ofthe conduct is likely to be ineffective because "it offends rather than
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C. The Enron Experience
Reports indicate that, like many other corporations, Enron had
developed a localized subculture.'57 The Enron culture is eerily reminiscent
of Tom Wolfe's fictionalized account, in which securities traders, or
"Masters of the Universe," produced amazing profits in a single
morning. ' Enron "masters" seem to have produced profits out of fictional
trades in sometimes nonexistent products.' In order to reach its profit
goals, Enron management encouraged aggressive competitive behavior
where success was measured by contributions to corporate wealth. Reports
characterize Enron as a corporate culture that disdained regulation and
pressured middle managers to produce profit. 6 As in fiction, Enron
executives were rewarded extremely well for this work.
The extraordinary sums paid to executives in salary and stock options
are now generally viewed as misplaced incentives that skewed the loyalty
of executives.' 61 Instead of aligning their interest with investors, stock
options seem to have encouraged aggressive tactics that enhanced the
company's stock price in order to increase the personal wealth of
executives. Although the debate over the effect of stock options is
unsettled, 16 at a minimum such extraordinary rewards communicate a notso-subtle message that a result favorable to the company justifies any
method used to achieve it.
The Enron culture also was marked by the use of a Darwinian market
discipline to evaluate employees. Enron's policy was to replace each year
all employees who were ranked in the lowest fifteen percent of their

educates the moral code of the community").
157. See ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 12 (2002)
(stating that the reason Enron failed "was the culture, stupid"); PETER C. FUSARO & Ross M.
MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONGAT ENRON 43 (2002) (noting Enron was an "extremely dysfunctional
organization"); MIMI SWARTZ WITH SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OFTHE
COLLAPSE OF ENRON 56 (2003).
A similar story is told about Arthur Andersen. See generally BARBARA LEY TOFFLER &
JENNIFER REINGOLD, FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED AND THE FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN

(2003).
158. TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987).

159. One deal involving video on demand and the Blockbuster video chain has been described
as "absurd," "a sham from its inception," and, most damning: "Not only did the emperor have no
clothes, there was no emperor." See Floyd Norris, Maybe the Most Dubious of the Deals, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2003, at C6 (quoting sources).
160. See BRYCE, supra note 157, at 12; FUSARO & MILLER, supra note 157, at 43.
161. See generally JOSEPH BLASE ET AL., IN THE COMPANY OF OWNERS: THE TRUTH AiiOUT
STOCK OPTIONS (AND WHY EVERY EMPLOYEE SHOULD HAVE THEM) (2003).

162. See Gretchen Morgenson, When Options Rise to Top, Guess Who Pays, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2002, § 3, at I (reporting a recent study that disproves two rationales for options).
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group.163 This system contributed to an environment in which employees
were afraid to express their opinions or to question unethical and
potentially illegal business practices.' 64 These disincentives led to
acquiescence and compliance as junior executives avoided encounters that
could negatively effect their semi-annual evaluation and may have
discouraged employees from reporting misgivings about borderline deals.
Enron's end shows that rewarding aggressive tactics invites fraud in;
squelching employees' misgivings shuts the door behind it.
The Enron culture probably influenced the behavior of its executives
and employees. One commentator has charged the Enron culture with
creating a "Machiavellian, narcissistic, prevaricating, pathologically
optimistic, free from self-doubt and moral distractions," and risk-taking
business executive. 16 5 If the individuals who engaged in wrongdoing were
influenced by this socially-destructive corporate culture, then relying only
on criminal sanctions may not be effective in containing its effects.
Punishing those caught up in such cultures, without changing the
environment that influenced them, will not prevent other individuals from
being similarly influenced. Remedying an environment that encourages
for levying criminal sanctions against the
law-breaking is one reason
166
itself.
entity
corporate
IV. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO ENCOURAGE
LAWFUL BUSINESS CONDUCT

The current embrace of criminal penalties seems to rest on the
proposition that the Enron experience is the product of a few "bad apples"
who were not deterred by existing criminal sanctions when tempted by an
opportunity to enrich themselves. 67 The "bad apple" assumption, however,

163. See FusARO & MILLER, supranote 157, at 51-52 (explaining Enron's "rank-and-yank"
evaluation system in which the lowest fifteen percent of employees were replaced every six
months); SWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 157, at 59-60 (describing the review system as the star
chamber combined with fraternity rush). Enron was known for hiring intelligent, ambitious,
aggressive self-starters who had a capacity for hard work. See BRYCE, supra note 157, at 121-22;
FusARo & MILLER, supra note 157, at 48-50.
164. See BRYCE, supra note 157, at 128 (stating that the review system "perverted Enron's
internal risk management systems").
165. See Ribstein, supra note 125, at 9.
166. Although the focus of this inquiry is on the unlawful conduct of individuals, this is not
to ignore the possibility that the threat of corporate criminal sanctions can motivate businesses to
shape and to monitor the conduct of its officers and executives. But see Michael K. Block, Optimal
Penalties, Criminal Laws, and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395 (1991)
(arguing against the use of criminal as opposed to civil penalties for corporations).
167. See Adam Cohen, Before WorldCom, the FuneralIndustry Set the Standardfor Venality,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 2002, at Al8 (recounting President Bush's argument that the executive
misdeeds were ethical lapses of a few bad actors, and that the solution was criminal prosecutions).
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is unsatisfactory. Rather than being confined to a few individuals, the
criminal conduct at Enron appears to have involved many people in a wide
range of fraudulent activity. Evidence disclosed thus far indicates that the
conduct was prevalent, and indeed, may have been endemic to the firm. As
is now known, the wrongdoing extended to Enron's accountants, auditors,
and bankers.
Moreover, the misconduct was not confined to Enron. Although Enron
stands out because of its serious and dramatic consequences, what
happened there was not an isolated case. Investigators have uncovered
unlawful conduct at a number of firms, including Intel, Adelphia, World
Com, Sunbeam, Waste Management, Xerox, and Global Crossing.'68 The
Enron saga has not yet completely unfolded, as investigators uncover
evidence of fraud in the California energy market and in Enron's
telecommunication division.'69
Finally, the view of Enron as an exception wrought by bad actors
ignores a rich history of fraud and misconduct in American business. The
major frauds of the South Sea Bubble in the early 1700s and those that
contributed to the market crash of 1929 are well-known. 7 ' Recent
incarnations involve price fixing in the electrical equipment industry, fraud
in the savings and loan and banking industries, and a massive insider
trading episode.' 7 ' More recently, criminal antitrust violations occurred in
the international commodities markets and by a prestigious auction
house. 7 2 The evidence of widespread misconduct at Enron and other
companies and the historical record of corporate frauds indicates that a
systemic failure, rather than bad apples, is at work.

168. See Stoller, supra note I (noting that fifty-four firms were under investigation in October
2002).
169. See sources cited supra note I1 (noting continuing prosecutorial efforts).
170. These have been characterized as inevitable results of boom to bust business cycles. Kurt
Eichenwald, After a Boom, There Will Be Scandal. Count On It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at C3
(quoting John C. Coffee Jr., who notes that the constant re-emergence of scandal "goes back at least
300 years... [i]t's just part of capitalism").
171. See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991) (recounting insider trading and
junk bond scandals); see also Ball & Friedman, supra note 143, at 219 (discussing public outrage
directed at trusts that led to passage of the Sherman Act and the price-fixing scandal in the
electricity industry); Boss & George, supra note 95, at 35 (reacting to the savings and loan scandal
of the 1980s).
In a similar episode, increased penalties failed to deter insider trading by Milken, Boesky,
Drexel Burnham, and others. See id. at 42-49 (providing legislative history that chronicled
legislators' surprise).
172. See generally KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT (2000) (chronicling the price-fixing
scheme of Archer Daniels Midland); JAMES B. LIEBER, RATS INTHEGRAN: THE DiRTYTRICKS AND
TRIALS OF ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND (2000) (same); Carol Vogel, CourtAccepts Sotheby's Guilty
Plea in Price-Fixing,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3. 2001, at C14.
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The "bad apple" interpretation of events at Enron suggests that it is a
simple story of purposeful criminal conduct based on greed. Although
there is no doubt some truth in the greed hypothesis,7 3 an alternate account
provides a more complete explanation. The alternate theory, based on
evidence from the firm's practices and research on rational behavior and
social norms, suggests a more complex narrative that has implications for
the role of criminal penalties in encouraging law-abiding conduct in the
business world. The expression of public values through criminal law does
not necessarily lead to law-abiding behavior when powerful subgroups
create opposing values. Criminal law is not particularly effective against
such subgroups and may not create the internalized social norms that are
necessary for compliance. Nor does the threat of stigmatization or
punishment always trigger the rational calculation that might deter
wrongdoers. Conduct that is perilously unlawful may not be recognized or
the risk of punishment may not be accurately assessed. And even when the
danger is recognized, it may be too late to change behavior.
A broader, more inclusive strategy would utilize a greater range of
enforcement mechanisms than that provided by criminal law. After all,
criminal law exists within an enforcement structure that also includes
government-administrative regulation, market incentives, and private
actions. 74 A comprehensive strategy should include all of these tools. They
provide several sources of intervention and many opportunities to signal
the possibility of unlawful conduct and to maintain and strengthen the
social norms that lead to law-abiding behavior.
A. Market Incentives and PrivateActions
Private actors, such as gatekeepers and investors, can encourage lawabiding business conduct. The wholesale failure of every monitor of
corporate conduct to identify and report wrongful or suspicious business
dealings is a prominent feature of the Enron debacle. 7 ' The failure of its
173. The self-dealing aspect of Enron's special purpose entities, which concealed the firm's
true financial condition while directing windfall profits to executives, certainly speaks of greed. Yet,
the greed narrative does not explain the absence of Swiss bank accounts and a flight plan. Both
Fastow and Kopper had involved their families and friends in the special purpose entities. These
factors speak of hubris, in addition to greed.
174. See Brown, supra note 23, at 1325 (noting corporate criminal law is part of an elaborate
regulatory regime governing firms and commercial activity).
175. Judge Sporkin's question, following the Lincoln Savings & Loan fraud, echoes in the
aftermath of Enron:
Where were these professionals... when these clearly improper transactions were
being consummated? ... What is difficult to understand is that with all the
professional talent involved (both accounting and legal), why at least one

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss4/1

32

Moohr: An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Co
THE MODEST ROLE OF CRIMINAL LAW IN PREVENTING CORPORATE CRIME

board, bankers, accountants, and lawyers to identify misrepresentations or
to inform regulatory agencies and the public was exacerbated by the failure
of outside gatekeepers, such as securities analysts and credit-rating
agencies, to alert investors of Enron's true financial condition. Professor
Coffee has remarked on the wholesale failure of market monitors to alert
investors of the true financial condition of Enron.' 76 My reason for
focusing on gatekeepers is to credit their significant function: they can
encourage law-abiding behavior.
Effective gatekeepers provide a counterweight to the norms that may
develop in corporate subcultures and to the judgment biases that lead to
inaccurate assessments ofthe risks of criminal sanctions. Monitors provide
an important measure of outside control, if only because they can increase
the chances of "getting caught" in civil or criminal actions. Thus, they may
deter those who engage in a rational calculation of risk and benefit. Market
monitors may also sound a timely warning that can signal corporate actors
that they are treading treacherously close to the line, leading them to make
the rational calculation in time to avoid or abandon potentially harmful
acts. At a minimum, early warnings by outside gatekeepers signal that the
company is the subject of a scrutiny that has market implications. Finally,
gatekeepers insert a countervailing pressure of community norms into the
firm's local culture.
A second private enforcement mechanism is the civil lawsuit brought
by investors who seek damages for negligence and civil fraud. Private suits
also express community norms, and the threat of civil litigation enhances
the risks of engaging in marginally-lawful conduct. Congress generally
handicapped the use of private lawsuits in the 1990s, however, and reduced
the incentive of gatekeepers to monitor firms aggressively.' 77 Perhaps
because of the focus on criminal penalties following Enron, there has been
professional would not have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching that took

place in this case.
Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901,920 (D.D.C. 1990). Before being appointed
to the federal bench in 1985, Judge Sporkin served for many years as Director of the Enforcement
Division of the SEC.
The failure of gatekeepers may provide a defense for wrongdoers. To the extent that
gatekeepers, lawyers, accountants, and analysts blessed the creation of Enron's special purpose
entities and other deals, executives may colorably claim a lack of intent to defraud. See supra text
accompanying notes 60-69 (discussing culpability element in criminal fraud).
176. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's AllAbout the Gatekeepers, Stupid,"
57 Bus. LAW 1403 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?: A Capsule Social and
Economic History of the 1990's 4 (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=373581.

177. See Michael H. Granof& Stephen A. Zeff, Unaccountablein Washington, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 23, 2000, at A19; Stephen Labaton, Now Who, Exactly, Got Us Into This?, N.Y. TiEs, Feb.
3, 2002, § 3, at 1; Don Van Natta, Jr., Bipartisan Outrage But Few Mea Culpas in Capital,N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 25, 2002, at C5.
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little interest in or hope of reversing
this weakening of the civil lawsuit
7
1
malfeasance.
corporate
for
remedy
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA).179 One provision of the PSLRA eliminated the practice of using
securities fraud as the basis for civil RICO actions.' Plaintiffs who won
such suits had been entitled to triple damages.' However, these were
thought to encourage frivolous suits and coercive settlements.1 2 In
protecting businesses from coercive settlements, the PSLRA also
eliminated a significant deterrent mechanism. The Supreme Court reduced
the deterrent element of civil RICO actions when, in 1993, it restricted
plaintiffs use of civil RICO suits against consulting, auditing, and legal
firms that had advised corporations accused of fraud. 3
The PSLRA also discouraged investor lawsuits that do not involve
RICO. It made it more difficult to bring class action suits, limitedjoint and
several liability, expanded safe harbors for certain company statements,
and toughened pleading requirements for fraud. 84
' The Supreme Court took
similar action when, in 1994, it eliminated civil liability for aiding and
178. The Collapse of Enron Corporation: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On
Commerce, Science & Transportation, 106th Cong. 9 (2001) (testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr.)
(noting that the PSLRA was an intensely lobbied statute that Congress would not wish to repeal or
modify); Hamilton, supra note 98, at 72-73 (suggesting repeal or modification of the PSLRA and
the SLUSA); see generally Melissa Harrison, The Assault on the Liability of Outside Professionals:
Are Lawyers and Accountants Offthe Hook?, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 473 (1997).
179. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). The controversial bill was enacted over
President Clinton's veto. See Harrison, supra note 178, at 518.
180. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 §§ 107, 108, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(2003).
181. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (providing civil cause of action). The purpose of the triple
damages was not only to compensate those injured by racketeering activity, but also to discourage
such activity. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1985).
182. 141 CONG. REc. 42, H2770-H2773 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (also
available at 1995 WL 91687).
183. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) (holding that civil RICO's
"operation and management" test to determine whether defendant participated in a pattern of
racketeering activity required proof of some level of operating or managing the enterprise).
In 1991, the Court announced a uniform statute of limitations for securities cases. See Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,364 (1991) (holding that limitations
period for private actions was within one year of discovery but not more than three years after the
transaction occurred).
To provide investors an expanded opportunity to bring suit, Sarbanes-Oxley extended the
limitations period to two years after discovery of the violation. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §
804, 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2003).
184. See Linda D. Fienberg, et al., Safer Harbors: Securities Litigation After the Reform Act
of 1995, 5 Bus. L. TODAY 24 (May/June 1996); see also, e.g., In re K-tel Int'l., Inc., 300 F.3d 881,
899-900 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of class action for failing to allege accounting
violations with requisite particularity and failure to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of
culpability).
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abetting fraudulent conduct involving securities laws. 85
' By narrowing civil
lawsuits against accountants and attorneys to cases of actual participation,
the Court reduced the incentive of such gatekeepers to monitor their clients
closely.
Congress also restricted'plaintiffs' ability to file securities fraud cases
in state courts. 8 6 The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(SLUSA), enacted in 1998, reduced securities fraud litigation in state
courts by making federal courts the exclusive venue for class actions
involving securities fraud.' 7 The combined effect of these actions was to
make it more difficult for private plaintiffs to bring allegations of securities
fraud against gatekeepers.
Although the long-term effect of these initiatives on the number and
nature of securities suits is subject to debate,188 their immediate effect was
to raise substantive standards and to heighten procedural hurdles to
investor civil suits against companies and gatekeepers. Two repercussions,
related to encouraging law-abiding business behavior, may be registered.
First, restricting the availability of a civil remedy expresses a
counterproductive community norm to corporate actors. An executive
might understandably reason that if conduct is not subject to suit in tort, it
is not unlawful; if the conduct is not unlawful, then it could not be
criminal. Second, the restrictive legislation may enter into the risk
calculation ofthe rational decisionmaker. If the risk of civil liability is low,
then there is even less risk of criminal action. Reducing civil liability also
removed an enforcement mechanism that had operated to deter wrongful
conduct. On the whole, the message inherent in the restriction of civil
fraud suits is inconsistent with and thus undercuts the effectiveness of
parallel criminal laws.

185. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994).
The PSLRA restored aiding and abetting liability in SEC enforcement actions. See Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2003).
186. Another obstacle to private suits is the arbitration agreement that investors must sign in
order to do business with broker-dealers. Investor contracts typically mandate arbitration, rather
than adjudication, of securities claims. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
187. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb(f) (2003); see also Newby v. Enron, 302 F.3d 295, 303 (5th
Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant's attempts to avoid the SLUSA were not in themselves an abuse
of the courts).
188. See Harrison, supra note 178, at 532-37; James A. Kassis, The Private Securities
LitigationReform Act of 1995: A Review of its Key Provisionsand an Assessment of its Effects at
the Close of2001, 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 119, 148 (2001) (presenting data and concluding that
the PSLRA has not curbed meritless class action suits).
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B. Government Administrative Actions
A second type of enforcement comes from government regulatory
actions.189 One drawback of such actions is that they can breach the due
process rights of individuals subject to civil-administrative punishment. 9
Notwithstanding the need to avoid that serious dilemma, administrative
enforcement offers an effective way to induce law-abiding behavior. 9 '
Less costly to the public fise than are criminal trials, government
regulation can reach more offenders in a way that achieves a degree of
horizontal equality between them. In addition, administrative enforcement
avoids the "psychology of resentment" that accompanies harsh punishment
voluntary compliance, and a sense of
and, instead, fosters self-regulation,
92
social responsibility.
On the regulatory front, Sarbanes-Oxley addresses weaknesses in the
present administrative scheme, especially those that pertain to accountants
and auditors. Those weaknesses were perceived as contributing to the fraud
at Enron and other firms. In creating the Public Company Accounting
Oversight board, the Act strengthens the ability of government regulators
to monitor and enforce administrative remedies.' 93 It also reshapes
189. See Lynch, supra note 30, at 34-36 (presenting theoretical rationale for use of
administrative remedies).
190. Civil sanctions that are essentially punitive raise substantial due process concerns. See
Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcendingthe Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325,1325-26 (1991); Susan R. Klein, Redrawingthe Criminal-CivilBoundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 679,680-81 (1999); Kenneth Mann, PunitiveCivil Sanctions: The MiddlegroundBetween
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1869-71 (1992); Carol Steiker, Punishment and
Procedure:Punishment Theory andthe Criminal-CivilProceduralDivide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 77778 (1997).
191. In order to buttress their effectiveness, most regulatory statutes include criminal sanctions.
Securities laws are one example; another is environmental statutes that have criminal sanctions for
air and water pollution. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2003); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2003).
Imposing criminal sanctions for technical violations of regulatory statutes has been met with
significant criticism. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401,421(1958); see also HERBERTL. PACKER, THE LIMITS OFTHE CRIMINAL SANCTION 273
(1968); Coffee, supra note 144, at 200; Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of
Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963). But see
Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalizationand the
Moral Content ofRegulatoryOffenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1133, 1535-37 (1997) (rejecting one critique
on the ground that engaging in conduct prohibited by the sovereign has a moral dimension).
192. See Brown, supra note 23, at 1313 (citing IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 8,

49 (1992)).

193. Congress mandated that the SEC complete the administrative restructuring by April 26,
2003. That process has gotten off to a slow and unpromising start. The first appointment to head
the accounting board, which is to formulate accounting rules, was mired in conflict when one
popular candidate, John H. Biggs, was by-passed. The selected candidate, William Webster,
resigned after it became public that he had chaired the audit committee of a company that had
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executive incentives by limiting corporate loans. The Act encourages
vigilant monitoring by limiting conflicts of interest in boards and by
requiring lawyers to report evidence of securities law violations. SarbanesOxley also expands the flow of information to the public by shortening the
time that corporate insiders have to disclose stock trades. Thus, the Act
promises to use regulatory law to control corporate misconduct.
To be effective, however, administrative agencies must have adequate
budgets and personnel. Several authorities have noted the declining rate of
enforcement by the SEC, which has faced increased filings and decreased
capability for a decade.' 94 Budgetary concerns have been alleviated by
increased funding for SEC enforcement, $711.7 million for the current
year.'95 The ultimate effectiveness of Sarbanes-Oxley in encouraging
lawful business conduct largely depends upon implementation and
enforcement of its regulatory reforms.
C. A Modest Role for CriminalLaw
Depending solely upon criminal law to control corporate crime is
misguided, at best. The threat of criminal penalties is not an adequate
deterrent given the limitations ofthe rational choice model of law-abiding
behavior.'96 Judgment biases, created by optimism and risk-taking, may
impair an individual's decisions. The deterrent threat is also not effective
when the risk of apprehension is slight and when it is aimed at actors who
control information and who may discount the costs of incarceration.
Changing the criminal laws and increasing penalties also does not
' Although the criminal
directly lead to an unconscious instinct to comply. 97
law has an important expressive function, reliance on criminal law alone
is not an effective way to create internalized norms. The criminal law can
only influence, not form, individual norms. In a corporate setting, contrary

issued questionable financial statements. See Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Picks a Fed Banker to Lead
Panel,N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 2003, at CI.
194. Filings grew by 61%, from 61,295 in 1991 to 98,745 in 2000; during that time, the SEC
staff had grown from 125 to 161, an increase of only 29%. In the 1980s, the SEC gave in-depth
review to company filings once every three years; by 2000 that level of review occurred only once
in seven years. See Hamilton, supra note 98, at 6-7 n. 16; see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SEC OPERATIONS: INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES GAO-02-302, 3 (2002).
195. Following criticism of the administration's backpedaling on its commitment to fund the
agency, Congress gave the SEC $170 million more than the White House had requested. For next
year's budget, the White House requested $841.5 million, a 92% increase over last year's budget.
See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. ChiefSays Fixing the Agency Will Take Time, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2003, at CI.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 121-36 (discussing limitations of rational choice
theory).
197. See supratext accompanying notes 144-50 (discussing limitations of social norm model).
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values may have a greater influence on individuals than those of the
community.
The punishment approach, which properly places blame on individual
actors, has a tendency to mask the need for a more comprehensive solution.
Criminal law's emphasis on personal accountability does not address
systemic characteristics of business crime, such as judgment biases and
corporate subcultures that might actually encourage illegal conduct.
Moreover, reliance on criminal law may lead legislators to neglect
initiatives that could be more productive in preventing future fraud.
Recourse to the criminal law alone is not an effective response to the type
of wrongdoing exemplified by the corporate scandals of 2002.
In the scheme endorsed here, enforcement through criminal law is one
part of a comprehensive approach. Criminal laws are the ultimate
expression of social norms that condemn immoral or harmful conduct. But
civil enforcement through private suits and government-regulatory actions
similarly express the community's values. Moreover, using criminal law
as a last resort, instead of as. a primary, mechanism, reinforces its
legitimacy. Legitimacy is an important factor in encouraging law-abiding
behavior because when the system is viewed as morally credible, even
those198who have not internalized the social norm are inclined to obey the
law.
Constructing a viable structure in which these systems interact for
maximum effectiveness and minimum intrusion upon due process rights
of the accused requires the participation of all stakeholders and enforcers,
as well as Congress. My point here is to emphasize the importance of
consistency in communicating a common standard. Each part of the
comprehensive scheme should reinforce the message sent by the other
enforcers. A consistent and forceful message is more likely to encourage
law-abiding conduct under either the rational choice or the unconscious
instinct models of compliance with the law. It is counterproductive to
include contrary messages, such as those arguably embodied in legislation
that hamstrings plaintiffs or in inadequate funding for administrative
enforcement. Thus, in the end, the regulatory provisions of the SarbanesOxley Act may be more significant in controlling business misconduct than
its criminal provisions.
In sum, Enron and related scandals demonstrate the need for structural
reform that will encourage law-abiding behavior by corporations and those
who serve them. Although the competitive impulse is the engine that
drives a free market system, a strong regulatory structure is necessary "to
prevent the ideal from consuming itself."' 99 The ultimate challenge is to

198. See id.
199. See Kadish, supra note 191, at 425.
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create systems within corporations to ensure that "fairly decent people
cannot be put under these hidden pressures again."2 ' The most effective
way to encourage law-abiding conduct is through a combination ofmarketmotivated gatekeepers, private remedial suits, government administrative
actions, and finally, criminal punishment.
V. CONCLUSION

Recent cheating scandals at major educational institutions show that it
is short-sighted to neglect the framework that makes cheating difficult and
to rely instead on honor systems that impose harsh penalties.2 ' Studies
show that honor systems are more effective if supported by procedures
such as monitoring of examinations, grading by professors, and warning
students about plagiarism and cheating. In the absence of such devices, it
is disingenuous for college administrators to express surprise and shock
when widespread cheating is uncovered.
Relying on criminal law as the chief means to prevent business
misconduct is like relying on honor codes to prevent student cheating.
Criminal laws, like harshly punished honor codes, are not sufficient in and
of themselves to prevent bad conduct. Like a college, we need structural
support for the values reflected in criminal laws. That support is provided
when the law works in concert with other regulatory devices, namely
private suits and government regulatory actions. Criminal law plays an
important role in regulating business conduct, but it is not the only player.

200. Kurt Eichenwald, Even ifHeads Roll, Mistrust Will Live On, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002,
§ 3, at I (quoting Professor John M. Darley).
201. See Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism,Norms, andthe Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations
on the Use of CriminalSanctions in Enforcing IntellectualPropertyRights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 167,
191-94 (2002) (noting startling increase in student plagiarism).
Cheating scandals have caught officials at prestigious institutions by surprise. See Glenn C.
Altschuler, College Prep; Battling the Cheats, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 2001, § 4A at 15; Amy
Argetsinger, U-Md. Says Students Use Phones to Cheat; Text Messaging Delivers Test Answers,
WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2003, at BI; Elissa Gootman, Columbia Students Charged in High-Tech
Cheating,N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at B 1;Diana Jean Schemo, U of Virginia Hit by Scandal
Over Cheating,N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at Al.
One college professor has linked the increase of corporate fraud with widespread academic
dishonesty. See Miguel Roig, In School, at Work, Lessons in Cheating,N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002,
at A26 (stating that one way of reducing tomorrow's white-collar crime is to hold today's students
to higher academic ethical standards).
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